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Abstract
The importance of public education in democratic states is almost beyond dispute. Too often, though,
discussions of democratic education focus solely on policies and systems, forgetting the individual
teachers who are ultimately responsible for educating future citizens. This paper attempts to illustrate
just how complex and significant the role of teachers in a democratic republic can be.
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I

recently watched the 2011 film American Teacher,
which aims to raise awareness about the plight of primary and
secondary public school teachers in the United States. Its
diagnosis of the problem is simple enough: Teachers do too much work
for too little pay. The documentary shows teachers exhausted from
working 60-and 70-hour weeks, teachers working second jobs to
support their “teaching habit,” teachers forced to leave the profession
for a job that will provide for their families. These situations are tragic,
and raising awareness of them is worthwhile. But the film’s most
important point is one it hardly touches upon.
Rhena Jasey is the only American teacher who emphasizes the
“intellectual rigor” of her profession. She points out that teachers
must make “thousands of decisions every moment—not about
abstract concepts but about children’s lives.” She explains that
presenting complex ideas and information in ways that are
comprehensible to young minds is a profoundly demanding task.
And she cites the refrain, too familiar to many of us: “Anyone can
teach, but you have an Ivy League education. You could do anything. Why become a teacher?”
When people ask this question, they are not implying that we
should find a job with shorter hours: Many Ivy Leaguers work
20-hour days as consultants. They are not implying that we should
avoid drudgery: Many Ivy Leaguers put themselves through
graduate school by grading exams and serving lattes by the
democracy & education, vol 22, n-o 2

thousand. They are not even implying that we should earn more
money: Many Ivy Leaguers take $20,000-a-year jobs at publishing
houses or as adjunct professors. No, what the puzzled question
suggests is that we should find a job that is intellectually fulfilling—
and that teaching is not that.
If this phenomenon resulted only in the mild discomfort of an
overprivileged few, it would hardly be worth mentioning. But the
misconception it illustrates—that teaching is not an intellectual
endeavor—threatens the very foundations of our political system.
To observe that democracy relies upon education is commonplace. Less frequently articulated are the ways in which democracy
relies specifically upon teachers and teaching. No matter how
thoughtful and thorough our curricula, policies, or procedures,
democratic education ultimately takes place between teachers and
students. It is teachers who must navigate what Brann (1989) calls
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the “paradoxes of education in a republic.” These are difficulties
that cannot be resolved in the abstract or codified out of existence
but instead require careful and continual management by those
who face them every day.
American Teacher does allude in certain subtle ways to the
possibility of seeing teaching as more than hard labor or charity
work. In comparing United States teachers to those in higher-
achieving countries, it mentions not only that the latter are better
paid but also that they are an elite group and respected as such.
The founder of The Equity Project, the New York charter school
that pays its teachers upwards of $125,000 a year, notes in his
interview that “if you pay teachers more, you change the perception of what it means to be a teacher” (i.e., that higher salaries may
be necessary but are certainly not sufficient to recruit and retain
highly skilled educators). But on the whole, the film’s portrait of
teachers invites more pity than awe.
Yet democracy’s teachers must be more than martyrs. Public
school teachers in the United States today teach about democracy,
with democracy, for democracy, in democracy, outside democracy—
even before and after and during democracy. Indeed, almost any
English preposition can fill in the blank, and to gloss over the
complexities of teaching _____ democracy is to undermine both
teaching and democracy. This paper therefore commits to struggling
with those complexities in all their frustrating untidiness.
The sections below attempt to illustrate three major elements
of democratic education: popular control over schooling, student
voice and choice in schools, and tolerance of differences. The goal
here is not to define these (admittedly nebulous) concepts theoretically; rather, it is to begin—barely!—the task of describing just
what it is we need from our nation’s teachers.

discussion of tolerance and pluralism. A teacher must have the
knowledge and capacity to eschew repression and discrimination no
matter what any school board or parent-teacher association says. This
is not only a matter of preserving citizens’ rights in the present but
also a way of protecting the future, as Gutmann (1987) makes clear:

Popular Control of Schooling

In other words, teachers who focus too much on teaching in
democracy might fail to teach for democracy—to prepare their
students to be independent-minded citizens of the sort essential to
the maintenance of a healthy democratic state. As Moe (2000) puts
it, “This is one of the ironies of democracy: the schools have
difficulty contributing to the quality of democratic government
precisely because they are democratically controlled” (p. 142).
There is no escaping from this conundrum, for it goes without
saying that tyranny is as undesirable as demagoguery—that
teachers who ignore the voices of their communities or violate
their students’ constitutional rights are no more democratic than
those enslaved to popular opinion.

Consider first the position of teachers in a democracy. They are
public servants, for (at least in theory) our schools are subject to
democratic control. At first glance this ideal seems to relieve them
of a great burden: In order to further our society’s democratic
ideals, they need only do whatever their communities ask of them.
If the populace wants them to teach evolution, they teach it. If it
votes for a creationist curriculum, so be it. After all, as Gutmann
(1987) reminds us, “Being an expert in education is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for claiming authority over
education in a democracy” (p. 80). Local businesses, universities,
elected officials, and especially parents all have stakes in the future
of their community and its children. If proper democratic procedures are in place, many difficult decisions about how to educate
children can be settled by votes, meetings, and other means of
ensuring popular control over schooling. Perhaps educators
themselves need worry only about technical questions of how best
to teach the knowledge and skills valued by the community.
Difficulties arise almost immediately, however. Most obvious is
the fact that our democracy is a constitutional one, designed explicitly
to make impossible a “tyranny of the majority.” Gutmann (1987)
herself defines democracy as majoritarian rule constrained by the
twin principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination—
constraints far from trivial and ones to which I will return below in a
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If democracy did not extend over time, we might best discover what a
community values on any particular occasion by collective deliberation
followed by unconstrained majority rule. The temporal dimension of
democracy requires us to ask whether the results of majority rule make
future decisions undemocratic either by restricting citizens’ capacity for
deliberation in the future or by excluding some citizens from full
participation in future deliberations. (pp. 95–96)

Perhaps this task is formulaic enough: Teachers should heed
the demands of their communities, unless those demands violate
anyone’s constitutional rights, in which case the latter take precedence. As long as laws and procedures are legitimate, teachers need
only defer to them in order to ensure that the education they
provide is democratic.
But that would be too easy. Here is Gutmann (1987) again:
When democratic control over primary [and secondary] schools is so
absolute as to render teachers unable to exercise intellectual discretion in
their work, (1) few independent-minded people are attracted to teaching,
(2) those who are attracted are frustrated in their attempts to think
creatively and independently, and (3) those who either willingly or
reluctantly conform to the demands of democratic authority teach an
undemocratic lesson to their students—of intellectual deference to
democratic authority. (p. 80)

This is why every teacher of democratic citizens stands . . . in the
methoria. The responsibility to teach places the teacher between the
consensus of his or her age and the unknown future. . . . Thus, the
teacher must construct the space of the pedagogic between the ideals
and the vocabulary and self-understanding of the given society.
(Steiner, 1994, p. 124)

In short, neither teaching in democracy nor teaching for
democracy can be sacrificed. A teacher must have the intellectual,
social, and ethical agility necessary to balance these two functions,
never losing sight of either even when they seem directly opposed
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to each other. With this requirement comes another: to avoid
eternal battles of conscience and will between self and community,
a teacher must not only balance contrary interests but also bring
them into dialogue with each other. After all, our democracy is not
only representative but also deliberative, dependent not only on the
vote but also on debate, persuasion, and consensus building. Again,
Steiner’s (1994) grandiloquence is perhaps not unwarranted: “The
community must be persuaded of the fallibility of its own judgment, of the responsibility of its educators to broker the difference
between its self-understanding and the silences, the blindness,
which that self-understanding has induced” (p. 124).
Thus, the democratic principle of allowing communities input
into their children’s education, far from relieving teachers of
responsibility for making controversial decisions, instead requires
that they both respect the decisions of others and model autonomous decision making for pupils who will one day be deciding the
fate of their own communities and children. No theory can
determine when each of these tasks should take precedence over
the other; only human ingenuity and sensitivity will suffice. It is the
teacher, not the procedure or the rule, that makes education
democratic—or not.

Student Voice and Choice
Thus far the teacher job description includes someone adept at
balancing the constitutional, procedural, and deliberative aspects
of democracy: someone with acute sensitivity to discriminatory
and repressive practices, someone who understands the demands
of the community being served, and someone skilled at communicating personal values and justifying professional practices when
they challenge public opinion (as in some cases they should, if the
teacher is to guard effectively against the “tyranny of the majority”).
But the above discussion may have implied that teaching for
democracy—that is, preparing students to be good citizens—is a
relatively simple task once one learns how to manage teaching in
democracy. Nothing could be further from the truth.
For one thing, even the verb preparing is problematic. Steiner
(1994) claims that “education, for Dewey, is about the preparation
of citizens who will engage in the constant reconstruction of the
public sphere” (p. 129), but Dewey would presumably object to
Steiner’s use of the future tense here. Dewey (1974) sees education
as “a process of living and not a preparation for future living”
(p. 430). He says, “The process and goal of education are one and
the same thing” (p. 434), and any education whose telos lies outside
itself is no education at all. Dewey is emphatic on this point, which
he sees as the very crux of education reform. The futile attempt “to
prepare future members of the social order in a medium” set
entirely apart from that order constitutes “the tragic weakness of
the present school” (p. 301). That is why, once his vision is realized,
school will no longer be “so set apart, so isolated from the ordinary
conditions and motives of life” (p. 302); it will instead be “a miniature community, an embryonic society” (p. 303). Brann (1989)
observes that “the question whether educational institutions
should be isolated from, or extensions of, ‘life,’ is of great importance in the pedagogy of a republic” (p. 45). Dewey, it seems, would
not hesitate in choosing the latter option.
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If he is right, then students should be citizens and not subjects
of their schools, which must be democratic institutions if they are
to teach students how to function in the larger democracy that is
society. Teaching for democracy must not entail teaching outside of
or prior to some other democratic existence; the pedagogical act
must instead embody authentic democracy in the here and now.
Again it seems at first glance that democracy takes a great deal
of pressure off the individual teacher. Perhaps all that is required of
teachers is that they respond to the needs expressed by their
students. After all, serving the populace in true democratic fashion
precludes imposing one’s own will on it. Constitutional provisions
for the protection of minorities still apply, of course: If a group of
students votes to steal one child’s lunch money and share it among
themselves, their teacher must intervene, limiting democracy for
its own sake by upholding Gutmann’s principles of nonrepression
and nondiscrimination. Nevertheless, the rule seems clear enough.
Defer to procedural democracy unless it flouts constitutional
democracy, and the education you provide will be appropriate.
At least two objections present themselves, however. First,
procedural democracy is hardly a monolithic force in itself. What
happens, for instance, if students’ wishes contradict their parents’?
Whom are teachers to serve, and how can they serve either or both
without, as above, failing to model the personal autonomy their
students need to learn in order to contribute to and benefit from the
democracy in which they live? Second, students are by definition
not yet qualified to be citizens. Children neither vote nor serve on
juries because society deems them incapable of fulfilling such
responsibilities; how, then, are teachers to treat them as fully
competent decisionmakers?
It may be said that the decisions students make in schools do
not have such weighty consequences as those a voter or juror
makes—that deciding what to study or what game to play is
precisely a way to practice, in a low-stakes setting, the skills
students will need in the future. It turns out, though, that classrooms are terribly high-stakes environments. In a commentary on
The Social Contract (1762),1 Steiner (1994) observes:
On the issue of openness Rousseau would be amused by the
contemporary exhortation to allow “students and teachers to negotiate
which courses, if any, are to be required.” This, in Rousseau’s view, would
be to expect students to judge the quality of a knowledge they had yet to
encounter. The product of such an education would not be freedom but,
instead, its reverse: children incapable of delayed gratification, of
schooling their impulses or accumulating knowledge. (p. 192)

That is, “the same principle that requires a state to grant adults
personal and political freedom also commits it to assuring children
an education which makes those freedoms both possible and
meaningful” (Gutmann, 1987; qtd. in Steiner, 1994, p. 11). Thus,
teachers who make their students sovereign over their own learning
in an excess of democratic fervor may undermine their own efforts to
teach _____ democracy by ultimately constraining their students’
ability to take advantage of their democratic freedoms. Put differently, “the pedagogical problem is how to protect the spontaneity of
genuine thinking and prevent abdication to experts while developing
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the competence to gauge and use the experts’ competence with some
authority” (Brann, 1989, p. 127). Here then is yet another balancing
act required of teachers by democracy: they must be authorities on
how to challenge authority, experts on how to question expertise—
teachers of both future citizens and present-day pseudocitizens,
people who must exist before, during, inside, and outside democracy
all at once. It is a “pedagogical problem” indeed.
It is worth noting that more than the future happiness of
children is at stake. First, Steiner (1994) explains:
Protagoras challenged the earliest citizens to find in themselves and
their experience the measure of all things. But his invitation is fraught
with difficulty. How can such citizens educate themselves to measure
more effectively? If the standard against which citizens are to hold
their judgments is a mirror, how might one give a public definition of
that standard? If every citizen is a sovereign measurer, what role
remains for a class of educators? (p. 184)

Given the limitations of children, the student-teacher
relationship is even more problematic than the citizen-sophist one
Steiner describes. Teachers must challenge their students to think
for themselves, but they must do so without renouncing their own
authority as adults and as educators. Otherwise, they teach
themselves out of a job, calling into question the very existence of
their profession. Further, quoting Rousseau, Steiner (1994) asks,
“How will a blind multitude, which often does not know what it wants
because it rarely knows what is good for it, carry out for itself an
undertaking as vast and difficult as a system of legislation” (Social
Contract, p. 67)? Citizens cannot simply rely on the wisdom of their
compatriots, for this would be expecting the impossible: “men would
have to be prior to laws what they ought to become by means of the
law” (p. 69). (p. 117)

The passage could be rephrased (and stripped of its rather
antidemocratic sentiment!) by pointing out that, given too much
power over their own schooling, students would have to be prior to
education what they ought to become by means of that education.
If a student is high-achieving enough to be placed in an advanced
track but would rather stay in lower-level classes, how does that
student’s teacher best serve democratic purposes? Does the teacher
defer to the student’s interests or encourage the child to “fulfill his
potential”? It is up to the teacher neither to assume preexisting
decision-making competence nor neglect to develop that competence in the children the teacher leads. If the teacher fails on either
count, democracy itself will fail, for people doomed to “blindness”
will never succeed at governing themselves.
Local control over educational agendas, student voice and
choice in schools, abhorrence of discrimination and repression,
the value of thinking for oneself—every educator in the country
must be acutely aware of all these aspects of the role as a teacher
_____ democracy. It is upon teachers’ everyday practice, upon the
continual negotiations and adaptations without which they cannot
manage their paradoxical role in society, that the strength of our
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democracy hinges. In short, the system does not create the
pedagogy; the pedagogy creates the system.

Teaching Tolerance
Thus far the constitutional aspects of democracy have appeared largely
as prohibitions against wrongdoing. Teachers can focus on the more
technical aspects of their jobs as long as they avoid violating anyone’s
rights, one might think. When Gutmann defines the nonprocedural
aspects of democracy in negative terms—as nonrepression and
nondiscrimination—she echoes a long tradition of “live and let live”
rhetoric that in this country dates back at least as far as Thomas
Jefferson. Take, for instance, Jefferson’s arguments for keeping
religious dogma out of the public schools. For him, religion is private,
government is public, and these facts are reasons enough to keep them
apart. “I have ever thought religion a concern purely between our God
and our consciences” (1816, para. 1), he explains, and “our civil rights
have no dependence on our religious opinions, any more than our
opinions in physics or geometry” (1786, para. 1). Further, “the
legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are
injurious to others. But it does me no injury for my neighbor to say
there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks
my leg” (1787, Query XVII, para. 2). From a public school teacher’s
point of view, all of this suggests that the teacher need not and should
not worry about students’ religious or other beliefs unless they actively
cheat or hurt other students. For Jefferson, though, this last caveat is
unnecessary. Why would disagreements about the number of gods
ever have the power to harm anyone?
The answer, of course, is that religious (and other) debates are
rarely so circumscribed. They are not only abstract discussions of
whether the Trinity is one god in three or three gods in one; they are
often fundamental disagreements over the most concrete aspects of
our private and public lives: how to dress at school, whom to date or
marry, what to eat in whose company. When one student in a
classroom holds forth on the sinfulness of abortion and homosexuality, for instance, in the presence of a student who has had an
abortion and another who is gay, then taking a hands-off approach
may actually cause psychological harm to the listeners or impede
their ability to learn. A teacher’s silence may be interpreted as an
abdication of responsibility to educate all children rather than as
strict attention to duties as a representative of the government. This
danger is perhaps greater now that our society is much more diverse
than it once was, but I would venture to propose that even in
Jefferson’s time religious debates could be fairly personal affairs. It is
difficult to see how simply ignoring students’ religious opinions—or
their differences in general—could ever have been a simple or
fail-safe option for any public school teacher.
Indeed there is a certain disturbing thread of apathy, of civic
disengagement, running through Jefferson’s writing. He claims he
“never yet saw an instance of one of two disputants convincing the
other by argument” (1808, para. 1). Of course, the careful and
sympathetic reader will conclude that he is warning only against
angry dispute, not against reasoned debate. A few sentences later,
though, he touts Benjamin Franklin’s stated policy of never
contradicting anyone and adds:
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When I hear another express an opinion, which is not mine, I say to
myself, He has a right to his opinion, as I to mine; why should I question
it. His error does me no injury, and shall I become a Don Quixot to bring
all men by force of argument, to one opinion? If a fact be misstated, it is
probable he is gratified by a belief of it, and I have no right to deprive him
of the gratification. . . . It is his affair, not mine, if he prefers error. (para. 1)

Here is a sublime level of tolerance, an attitude that would
improve many a classroom and society. But it is what Pangle and
Pangle (2000) call “a tolerance that is a ‘mere’ toleration: a thin
pluralism of coexisting but mutually indifferent or hostile multicultural posturings” (p. 24). Their diagnosis is this:
The balances delicately articulated in our original, founding public
philosophy have been decisively tilted: rights have eclipsed
responsibilities, freedom has obscured virtue, tolerance has rendered
suspicious the passing of moral judgments, and concern for
autonomous choice has come to outweigh concern for human
fulfillment found in dedication and devotion. (p. 23)

All of this translates into yet another delicate balancing act
required of teachers in the United States today. On the one hand,
they must heed Jefferson’s warnings against embarking on quixotic
quests to convert the world to their own beliefs. On the other hand,
open-minded teaching must mean more than condescending to
humor those who are doomed to “error.” There are ways to teach
without dogma, to tolerate without indifference. Jefferson once
struggled to define such strategies in theory; educators must
struggle every day to define them in practice. Otherwise, they risk
teaching only apathy or resentment.
What these texts and others give teachers are not rules; they
are guidelines that require continual interpretation and adaptation
in ever-changing contexts. Like democratic control over schools
and democratic training within schools, tolerance of pluralism
requires individual teachers capable and aware enough to make an
unending series of tough decisions about how best to educate
_____ democracy.

Conclusions and Implications
Steiner (1994) is admirably forthright on the subject of translating
theory into practice:
What all theorists implicitly hope for (present company included) is a
process of benign trickle-down. Those who make education their
profession are, through some mysterious symbiotic process, to be made
aware of our ideas and understand how and when to modify them for
practical use. (p. 198)

He knows of course that the “mysterious symbiotic process”
cannot be carried out by anyone but teachers themselves. Thus his
conclusion, which follows pages and pages of confidently worded
abstractions, is replete with phrases like “teachers would be free to
select . . .” (1994, p. 201), “the teacher may judge . . .” (p. 203), “as ever,
it is the teacher who will negotiate the tension . . .” (p. 205), “only the
individual . . . teacher can gauge . . .” (p. 205), and “teachers should be
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free to select . . .” (p. 209). In the end there is no escaping the obvious:
all the negotiating, all the balancing and compromising and
juggling—all the complexity democracy demands of its educational
systems—all this is manifest nowhere more clearly than in everyday
interactions between individual teachers and their students.
Of course, teachers need not bear sole responsibility for the
vitality of our democracy. The goal of this paper is to recognize the
challenges teachers face, not to increase them. Non-teachers too
must play a role: distributing resources, promulgating mission
statements, designing administrative structures, holding school
board elections, establishing student governments, developing
curricula, engaging families and communities, writing laws,
enforcing regulations—all these are important and indeed indispensible aspects of public education in a democratic republic. But they
are also insufficient. Administrators, policymakers, and curriculum
designers can help design democratic education systems, but they
cannot ensure democratic teaching. Only teachers can do that.
Thus, teacher training programs must recruit and educate
candidates capable of rising to all the challenges of teaching _____
democracy. School administrators must support and demand
acuity and discernment, not drudgery or self-sacrifice, from their
faculty members. Policymakers must understand how pedagogy
interacts with policy in the realm of democratic education. Most of
all, though, teachers must understand just how important they are.

Notes
1. See The Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right,
available online at http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm
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